From Technical Value to Storage Revenue: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Energy Storage Deployment in Highway Service Areas
Dingxiong Shi, Wei Li, Songbo Guo, Yuhong ZhaoDeploying photovoltaic generation, energy storage, and electric-vehicle charging in highway service areas requires alignment between storage’s technical benefits and the incentives of implementing organizations. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game involving highway operators, local governments, and the central government to examine how storage-attributable revenue, conditional subsidies, implementation costs, and supervision shape deployment decisions. The results reveal that stable coordination depends on the alignment of operator investment incentives and local government implementation incentives. Subsidy allocation is therefore subject to a two-sided constraint: increasing support for operators can encourage storage investment but may undermine local implementation when insufficient resources remain for coordination. Central supervision plays a complementary role, with intensive intervention influencing strategic adjustment and routine oversight becoming compatible with stable coordination once participation incentives are aligned. Extended simulations further reveal that apparent short-term coordination can conceal unstable incentive structures, while locally stable outcomes may remain sensitive to initial strategic conditions. These findings highlight the importance of coordinating financial returns, implementation resources, and supervisory arrangements, providing a governance perspective on how the technical value of energy storage can support sustained deployment in highway service areas.