From Enforcement To Prevention

Agricultural subsidy programs in Indonesia exhibit a persistent paradox: reported fertilizer shortages among farmers coexist with aggregate surplus at the end of the distribution cycle. This study examines the governance conditions underlying this paradox through qualitative institutional analysis based on field monitoring, stakeholder consultations, focus group discussions with governance experts (UI-CSGAR), and regulatory review. The analysis identifies structural vulnerabilities related to weak beneficiary data verification, limited transparency in distribution mechanisms, fragmented monitoring systems, and inconsistencies in machinery allocation and utilization. Drawing on Fraud Triangle Theory, Principal–Agent Theory, and Situational Crime Prevention, the study finds that corruption risks are primarily shaped by opportunity structures, information asymmetry, and permissive institutional environments embedded within subsidy governance systems. To address these challenges, the study proposes the IDAWS framework (Insert, Declare, Assist, Warning, and Strike), developed by the Corruption Prevention Task Force of the Indonesian National Police (Kortastipidkor Polri), as an institutionally grounded preventive governance model. The framework integrates early institutional engagement, collaborative oversight, and graduated enforcement mechanisms, positioning enforcement as an ultimum remedium. By translating field-based practices into an analytical model, this study demonstrates how preventive governance approaches can be embedded within policy implementation to strengthen accountability in complex public sector programs.