Formalised yet uneven: legal protections in United Nations Security Council counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation financing sanctions regimes
Daley J. Birkett, Doron GoldbarshtPurpose
This paper aims to examine how legal protections vary across United Nations Security Council (UNSC) counter-terrorism financing (CTF) and counter-proliferation financing (CPF) sanctions regimes and why this variation persists. It argues that this unevenness reflects institutional design: preventive financial restraints are administered through committee-based, non-judicial mechanisms rather than a common rights-based review framework.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper adopts a doctrinal and comparative institutional approach, analysing UNSC resolutions, sanctions committee guidelines and associated procedural mechanisms across CTF- and CPF-oriented targeted sanctions regimes. It compares the availability and operation of exemptions, de-listing procedures, Ombudsperson review and ancillary listing and review safeguards. The analysis is limited to publicly available UNSC materials and focuses on institutional design rather than domestic implementation or empirical practice.
Findings
Legal protections across UNSC CTF and CPF sanctions regimes are increasingly formalised but unevenly distributed. Regimes addressing ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida incorporate comparatively developed procedural mechanisms, including Ombudsperson review, while others rely on more limited forms of review. This unevenness reflects differentiated institutional development and the path-dependent evolution of safeguards. Even the most developed arrangements lack independent judicial determination.
Originality/value
The paper provides a systematic comparative analysis of legal protections across CTF and CPF sanctions regimes. It advances financial crime scholarship by applying a legal protection perspective to preventive financial restraints, showing how asset freezes operate as instruments of governance and control while affording uneven procedural protection. It clarifies why formalisation of safeguards does not necessarily produce uniform, rights-based or judicial legal protection.