Finance, data, and structural precarity: Pathways to labor regulation in platform capitalism

This paper analyzes contemporary regulations of digital platform work on the hypothesis that these regulations are mainly focused on addressing the apparent effects of precariousness, without significantly intervening in the business models of platform companies or in the logic of accumulation based on financialization and datafication. To this end, it draws on contributions from the French School of Regulation, Marxism, and critical studies of digital platforms, employing the categories of regime of accumulation and mode of regulation. Methodologically, the study conducts qualitative, comparative, and documentary research on 52 regulatory acts from 27 countries, in addition to the European Union Directive, proposing a typology of regulatory scope (narrow, moderate, and broad) based on the reach of interventions regarding the effects of precariousness, business models, and the logic of accumulation of platforms. The results indicate that 27 regulations have narrow regulatory scope, focusing on compensation, social protection, and transparency; 23 have moderate regulatory scope, imposing partial restrictions on algorithmic management, the classification of employment relationships, and monetization mechanisms; and only two regulations have broad regulatory scope, addressing structural elements of the processes of financialization and datafication. It can be concluded that the prevailing regulatory framework reduces workers’ immediate vulnerabilities but preserves the economic mechanisms responsible for perpetuating precariousness in platform capitalism.