Fairness from an Economist’s Perspective. John Rawls versus Robert Nozick

The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the theories of justice by John Rawls and Robert Nozick from the perspective of economic science. The choice of these concepts is due to their fundamental differences, which allow for identifying and assessing the risks of economic consequences that may arise from the implementation of alternative principles of justice. John Rawls defines justice through the principle of equal basic rights and freedoms for all, allowing economic and/or social inequality only in cases where it benefits the least advantaged members of society. Robert Nozick, as a proponent of the minimal state, views justice as the observance of each individual’s right to self-ownership and considers any coercive redistribution of resources (including taxation) unjust, except for cases of rectifying past injustices. The analysis shows that the high level of social support envisioned by Rawls’ concept to reduce inequality may distort market incentives, create a free-rider problem, foster a tendency toward voluntary unemployment, contribute to the bureaucratization of the economy (amplifying the «leaky bucket» effect), and create conditions for institutional capture. Additionally, Rawls’ main mechanism, the «veil of ignorance», intended for fair distribution of goods, may not function as the author assumes. On the other hand, Nozick’s minimal state, due to its rejection of income redistribution, may lead to inequality traps, tendencies toward the emergence of ghettos and increased crime, as well as problems in funding public goods. Moreover, the consistent application of the rectification principle, which could result in large-scale property redistribution, may entail significant social and economic costs. Despite the conceptual value of both theories, their inherent shortcomings make them unsuitable in their pure form for practical implementation in a real economic system.