Extrication versus self-entrenchment: Intra-military relations and post-military coup transition outcomes

Military coups constitute potential critical junctures enabling social forces to reshape the political arena. In the aftermaths of military coups, juntas face two options: first, they can organize multiparty elections, refrain from interfering in them, and extricate themselves from executive power, thereby creating the foundations for democratic regimes; second, they can rig elections and create praetorian-led electoral authoritarian regimes. This article draws on a global dataset encompassing all post-coup electoral outcomes since 1990 to assess the frequency and political consequences of these two trajectories. It focuses on the internal dynamics between the junta and the broader military establishment to theorize the conditions under which different post-coup transition outcomes tend to occur. Two conditions shape post-coup transition outcomes: the junta’s institutional incentives and its capacity to unite the armed forces at large behind its desired outcome. The conditions provoking military intervention—the immediate coup triggers—influence both. Consequently, post-coup transitions are not entirely contingent. They tend to follow recognizable patterns shaped by the immediate coup triggers. By offering both conceptual and empirical insights, the article lays the foundation for future actor-centric research on civil-military relations and the long-term implications of military coups in contemporary politics.