Externalities and norms in the context of a novel virus

Pandemics create social dilemmas. Everyone benefits from health behaviors that reduce the transmission of damaging infectious diseases. But people may not want to bear the costs of engaging in health behaviors themselves. Research suggests that if an action (like failing to engage in a health behavior) has consequences for others (i.e., produces externalities), those others will disapprove of the behavior and expect others to also disapprove. In the pandemic context, this argument suggests that norms will support health behaviors. But in situations in which some subgroups are affected by the virus and others are not, norms supporting health behaviors should be weaker. This is because people at risk from a virus are likely to be more supportive of health behaviors than those who are not. And people are likely to expect individuals in groups affected by a virus to support health behaviors more than those who are not affected. We use two online vignette experiments to test this externalities argument in the context of a novel virus. Results partially support the hypotheses. Theoretically, the study contributes to understanding of how patterns of externalities affect normative beliefs and expectations. Substantively, it has implications for messaging about the effects of viruses and the promotion of health behaviors aimed at reducing disease transmission.