Evolutionary dynamics of a four-stakeholder ecosystem for misinformation governance on short-video platforms

Abstract

Misinformation governance on short-video platforms depends on strategic interaction among online media, netizens, platforms and government regulators, but platform decisions are often treated as exogenous in two- and three-party models. We develop a quadripartite evolutionary game model to examine these interactions under bounded rationality. Equilibrium analysis and numerical simulations identify the stable strategy profiles and the conditions under which they emerge. Under the baseline parameters, the system has a unique asymptotically stable profile. Platforms adopt active governance, media report without verification, government regulators apply loose supervision and netizens assess information rationally. Parameter analysis shows that higher platform traffic revenue, a greater probability of insider refutation, and larger credibility and reputational losses accelerate convergence to this profile. Strict supervision can alter the transient evolutionary path and accelerate convergence under the benchmark conditions, but it is not part of the stable profile. Within the model, active platform governance and user rationality are the principal stabilizing factors, while government supervision plays a complementary role. These results provide a modelling basis for coordinating platform, user and regulatory responses to misinformation in short-video ecosystems.