Doubt’s Dual Triggers: A Pilot Experimental Study on Epistemic Beliefs Using a Climate-Related Controversy

Abstract

Facing the actual challenge of living in a post-truth era, the pilot study investigated correlates of epistemic doubt and epistemic change when integrating multiple sources of information, with particular focus on identifying the cognitive and affective responses associated with epistemic doubt. To evoke epistemic doubt, we manipulated the structure of information presentation, about causes of climate change, through three conditions: exposure to multiple conflicting sources (mixed arguments) or to consistent sources (solely human-caused or natural-caused climate change arguments). Epistemic doubt differed across conditions (η² = .153, p < .01), being highest after exposure to conflicting sources, and both confidence-weighted belief-information discrepancy and epistemic confusion accounted for unique variance in doubt, although these associations were condition-sensitive. Epistemic doubt predicted epistemic change (10%, p < .05), whereas experimental conditions and cognitive-affective responses predicted doubt but not epistemic change directly. In pooled analyses, confidence-weighted belief-information discrepancy and epistemic confusion predicted epistemic doubt more strongly than prior epistemic beliefs and comprehension, tentatively suggesting that situational responses to information may matter more than pre-existing epistemic sophistication. Despite the pilot study’s limitations, these exploratory findings offer preliminary evidence on the correlates of epistemic doubt and change, with implications for future research discussed.