Domestic Spoilers in Nuclear Deals: The Collapse of the United States–North Korea Agreed Framework

ABSTRACT

Why did nuclear cooperation between the United States and North Korea collapse after nearly a decade under the Agreed Framework? Using spoiler theory, this article explains how domestic political opposition can undermine the implementation of nuclear agreements between adversarial states. It argues that when domestic spoilers gain influence over implementation decisions, they are able to disrupt efforts to sustain cooperation. Analyzing the 1994–2002 Agreed Framework, the article focuses on United States‐side spoilers and shows that during the Clinton administration, deal custodians contained domestic opposition and maintained cooperation despite persistent resistance. After 2001, however, opponents of engagement captured key implementation levers, and cooperation unraveled. The collapse of the Agreed Framework was thus largely the result of spoiler intervention rather than an unavoidable response to North Korean noncompliance.