Does the law matter for the poor? Evaluating the response to a child begging regulation

Some scholars argue that poverty reduces responsiveness to regulatory incentives, reducing the law’s deterrent effects. Conversely, some expect the poor to assess risks better and to be more risk-averse. In the former case, destitute people will be less likely to comply with criminal regulations. We test this prediction with the help of a natural experiment: the proclamation of a Brussels city council bylaw that forbids the presence of children accompanying beggars. Questionnaire survey data from people who beg were collected in Brussels before and after the proclamation of the bylaw and a decade before the declaration of the bylaw using the same seasonal design. A difference-in-differences approach shows that begging with children decreased after the regulation. We find no evidence of a displacement effect, where beggars with children move to the periphery. The results suggest that individuals in extreme poverty are highly responsive to the incentives communicated by law.