Disparities in delegation size and their implications for equitable participation at CITES CoP meetings

Abstract

In multilateral environmental agreements, procedural fairness depends not only on a Party's right to attend but on its capacity to participate. We examined which Party‐level traits predict delegation size at the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) Conferences of the Parties (CoPs) and how delegation size shapes voting and working group participation when Committees meet concurrently. Using Bayesian multilevel models, we analyzed attendance, voting records, and working‐group rosters for CoP16–20. On average, 10% of Parties sent no delegates and 16% sent just one, while Committees I and II overlapped for 80% of session time. Small island developing Parties more frequently sent one‐person delegations. CITES working‐language match, OECD membership, and stronger national CITES legislation predicted larger delegations. Voting and working group participation rose with delegation size. One‐person delegations were more often absent, or ineligible to vote due to credential issues, with Committee II most affected. Under present‐and‐voting rules, coordinated blocs and sparse presence can shape outcomes. Because the most constrained Parties are often lower‐middle‐income range states expected to implement listings, these gaps weaken input legitimacy and voluntary compliance. Options include credential pre‐checks, retargeted sponsorship ensuring at least two delegates per Party, and scheduling or hybrid adjustments.