Discretion, rotational programs and reported corruption in public procurement: an analysis of Italian municipalities
Diletta Vito, Daniele Tammaro, Giuseppe D’OnzaPurpose
This paper aims to assess whether municipalities that increased their reliance on direct award procedures (DAP) after the 2020 Italian procurement reform, which more than tripled the monetary threshold for DAP, were more likely to report corruption cases and whether staff rotation moderates this association.
Design/methodology/approach
The analysis focuses on Italian municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants over the period 2016–2023. It uses difference-in-differences and triple-difference designs to analyze, respectively, whether municipalities that increased their reliance on DAP after the reform experienced a higher likelihood of reported corruption and whether staff rotation moderated this relationship.
Findings
Municipalities that increased their reliance on DAP after the reform are more likely to report at least one corruption case. The results also indicate that staff rotation mitigates this association.
Originality/value
This paper offers novel evidence on the association between municipalities’ increased reliance on discretionary procurement procedures and reported corruption at the municipal level, complementing contract-level analyses by focusing on a nationwide regulatory change. It further extends prior experimental evidence on staff rotation by providing longitudinal, real-world evidence on how staff rotation moderates the association between increased reliance on DAPs and reported corruption when administrative discretion is increased.