Direct reference and the Goldbach puzzle

Abstract

So‐called Neo‐Russellians, such as Salmon, Braun, Crimmins, and Perry, hold that the semantic content of ‘ is ’ in a context is the singular proposition o, P, where is the referent of the name in , and is the property expressed by the predicate in . This is also known as the Neo‐Russellian theory. Using truth ascriptions with names designating propositions, such as ‘Goldbach's conjecture’, in this paper, I will argue that, together with highly plausible principles regarding a priori knowledge, the Neo‐Russellian theory leads to unacceptable consequences. I will call this ‘the Goldbach puzzle’. Since the solution to the Goldbach puzzle cannot be to reject the discussed principles regarding a priori knowledge, the puzzle will undermine the Neo‐Russellian theory.