Democratic Backsliding and Public Administration in Latin America

This chapter examines how contemporary democratic backsliding in Latin America reshapes the administrative state, arguing that the erosion of public administration is not merely a byproduct of democratic decline but a mechanism through which elected executives consolidate power. Using a mixed-method descriptive design, we map trajectories of democratic backsliding and two core administrative dimensions – meritocracy and impartiality – across 22 Latin American countries since the late 1990s using cross-national panel indicators, and then pair these region-wide patterns with focused case illustrations from Bolivia, Venezuela, and Colombia to clarify the mechanisms linking regime change to the politicisation (or resilience) of the civil service. The chapter conceptualises backsliding as a staged process and explains why rule-bound bureaucracies become prime targets: by capturing recruitment, oversight bodies, and civil service rules, leaders can substitute loyalty for competence, politicise routine administrative decisions, and weaken constraints on executive discretion. Descriptively, the chapter highlights an asymmetry across democratic dimensions: contestation (credible competition and alternation) more consistently protects merit and impartiality than participation, which can be preserved or even mobilised for legitimation while competition is hollowed out. The case evidence shows how deepening backsliding in Bolivia and Venezuela enabled systematic replacement of technocrats with loyalists and, in Venezuela, parallel structures that bypassed professional rules, while Colombia’s stronger judicial veto points, meaningful alternation, and societal oversight constrained similar efforts.