Defending Religious Freedom as Equality

Abstract

In a separate essay, we argue that a right to freedom of religion as it is standardly understood is morally indefensible. In this article, we sharpen this proposition, arguing that there is no account of religion on which there is even a pro tanto right for activities to be exempted from generally applicable regulations—or otherwise privileged over other human projects, commitments, and passions—in virtue of their being religiously motivated. Beyond largely uncontroversial invocations of freedoms of thought, speech, and association, what remains of a pre-theoretical embrace of a right to freedom of religion is best explained by the principle of equal regard. Along the way, we respond to the work of Cécile Laborde and Alan Patten, who both maintain that an equality-centered view of religious freedom cannot adequately protect religion unless religious exercise is understood to be elevated in value over other human projects. In our response, we review our account of equal regard and its application to the kinds of cases that worry Laborde and Patten, showing that equal regard can account for the sense of injustice elicited by those cases. We also briefly address the positive views of Laborde and Patten and suggest that their accounts, and others with the same structure, inherit the problems of more straightforward accounts of freedom of religion.