Death, Deprivation, and the Symmetry Problem

ABSTRACT

According to the deprivation account of the badness of death, death is bad for the one who dies because it deprives her of goods she would otherwise have enjoyed. This view faces the so‐called symmetry problem when one considers prenatal nonexistence. Scholars have proposed various solutions to this problem, but all of them encounter their own difficulties. In this paper, I propose a new solution to the symmetry problem. The symmetry problem focuses on the rationality of regretting death and prenatal nonexistence. However, the meaning of rationality in the symmetry problem is ambiguous as it stands and can be further clarified. I argue that, once the meaning of rationality has been clarified, then it becomes apparent that the symmetry problem fails. Consequently, the apparent force of the symmetry problem stems from an obscurity in the meaning of rationality. I also argue that my solution avoids difficulties with the most prominent solutions to the symmetry problem.