Cyber‐Resilient Angle Droop Real Power Sharing for IBRs Against GPS Spoofing

ABSTRACT

Power sharing for inverter‐based resources (IBR) coordinates the flow of real power in response to changing demand. In some angle droop–based power sharing algorithms, global positioning system (GPS) communication is used to provide an accurate timing reference to the IBR power sharing controller. However, this GPS communication exposes the IBR power sharing controller to GPS spoofing attacks. This paper first proposes a decision tree detection method for GPS spoofing attacks on power sharing controller. This detection method detects a GPS spoofing attack. Moreover, a long short‐term memory (LSTM) is proposed to mitigate the impact of the GPS spoofing attacks by estimating the phase reference of the IBR controller, and taking corrective action with integral control. The LSTM mitigation outperforms a state observer–based mitigation approach proposed in the literature. The performance of the proposed algorithms is tested under various cases in a cosimulation environment with a communication layer built in Python and the modified IEEE 39‐bus benchmark power system in PSCAD/EMTDC.