Criticizing the Methodological Realisability of the Value-Free Ideal: A Response to Sikorski

Abstract

The value-free ideal (VFI) has recently been the subject of renewed interest with some authors attempting to defend it in the face of ongoing criticism. A particularly ambitious project is that of the methodological vindication of realisability, which attempts to vindicate the VFI through arguments aimed at scientific methodology and how research practice can be amended to avoid the influence of non-epistemic values. I shall critically review the debate around the strategy of methodological vindication and respond to the attempts at vindicating the VFI. Thereby, I will draw a distinction between two aspects of the classic argument against the VFI usually referred to as the argument from inductive risk (AIR) and show why a distinction between a problem of context-sensitivity and a problem of translation is relevant. Utilizing this distinction, I shall demonstrate why the methodological vindication is ultimately unsuccessful.