Confucius, Ritual, and Shared Moral Agency

ABSTRACT

How can ethical agency be grounded without presupposing an inner, autonomous mind? This article revisits Herbert Fingarette's influential interpretation of the Analects , focusing on his claim that ritual ( li 禮) possesses a “magical power” that structures ethical life. Fingarette argues that Confucian ethics is grounded not primarily in inward deliberation or free will, but in patterned forms of ritualized interaction. Although this view has been criticized for neglecting mind, subjectivity, and moral autonomy, I argue that its central insight remains philosophically significant. By clarifying Fingarette's position and reassessing major criticisms, the article makes an original contribution by developing Fingarette's interpretation into a constructive account of shared moral agency. This account grounds ethical agency in embodied and relational practice, showing how reflection, intention, choice, and individuality can be understood within shared ritual life rather than through the framework of an isolated moral subject.