DOI: 10.11648/j.ijsts.20261404.12 ISSN: 2330-7420

Conditions for the Transition from Reflexivity to Projective Action in the Morphogenetic Approach: T0, Chronostructures, and the Problem of Suspended Agency

Marek Wos
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This article addresses the problem of the transition from reflexivity (T2) to projective action (T3) within Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic approach. The argument is developed through a retroductive mode of explanation. Empirical evidence concerning young people’s digital activity points to a configuration of suspended agency that cannot be explained with sufficient precision by the classical morphogenetic model alone. As a possible solution, the article proposes the concept of T0, understood as a relational generative mechanism enabling the operational integration and stabilization of axiological orientations in action. T0 does not constitute an additional level within the morphogenetic sequence. Rather, it functions as an explanatory condition that accounts for the transition from reflexivity to relatively stable forms of projective action. The article further develops the concept of chronostructures, understood as temporal conditions that stabilize social practices, and demonstrates their complementarity with T0. While T0 concerns the axiological integration of action, chronostructures provide the temporal conditions necessary for the continuity and sustainability of purposeful agency. The empirical illustration of the problem draws on data from EU Kids Online 2026, reports published by NASK, and findings from the Youth 4.0 project. The analysis demonstrates that suspended agency can be more adequately explained as the outcome of the simultaneous weakening of two complementary conditions: T0, responsible for the axiological integration of action, and chronostructures, responsible for its temporal stabilization. The principal theoretical contribution of the article consists in reconstructing T0 as a retroductively inferred explanatory mechanism complementing Archer's morphogenetic model rather than extending its ontology. The proposed model provides a more adequate explanation why reflexivity and declared values do not necessarily develop into sustained forms of projective action, despite continued access to cultural resources.

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