Concessions and Protest Demobilization

How and why do concessions, or promises to implement reform in the future, affect protest mobilization in autocracies? Concessions are a routine response to protest and generate a puzzling empirical regularity: Although autocrats often renege once protest abates, concessions can produce demobilization. We develop a model showing that concessions demobilize by exploiting heterogeneity among protesters. A subgroup of moderates, who derive symbolic value from the autocrat’s promise to reform, and a subgroup of radicals, who value only implemented reforms, must coordinate to sustain protest after a concession. Concessions undermine the between-group coordination necessary for protests large enough to prevent reneging. Some moderates demobilize in response to promised concessions, and in turn, declining turnout demobilizes radicals. Even autocrats in highly repressive regimes may concede because concessions and repression demobilize through distinct mechanisms. However, concessions lose efficacy as moderates lose trust in the autocrat. Morocco’s Feb20 movement illustrates the theory.