Clarifying the Distinction Between Inclining Moral Bioenhancement and Prohibitory Moral Bioenhancement, and Their Effects on Freedom

The project of Moral Bioenhancement (MBE)—biomedical interventions causing individuals to have better moral beliefs, motivations, or behaviours—is controversial, particularly as MBE relates to human freedom. Proponents argue that MBE is utility‐promoting and compatible with freedom. Conversely, critics charge that MBE—particularly when it bypasses or replaces rational moral deliberation, or when it is imposed compulsorily—threatens freedom of thought and action. I argue that much of the disagreement on this topic is due to conflation and obfuscation, resulting in conceptual confusion. Accordingly, I draw a distinction between two types of MBEs: those that incline individuals to moral action, and those that prohibit immoral action, by invoking the higher‐order desires of Harry Frankfurt's freedom of the will. Importantly, this distinction runs parallel to, rather than tracking, the familiar distinction between voluntary and compulsory MBE. Ultimately, I argue that inclining MBE interventions may not infringe, and may even enhance, freedom by allowing individuals to translate sincerely held moral beliefs into desired moral behaviours, enabling freedom as moral self‐mastery. Conversely, prohibitory MBEs necessarily restrict freedom, though this does not by itself entail that they are impermissible in all circumstances.