Caretaker Governments, Elevated Street-level Discretion, and Implications for Democracy: Evidence from Pakistan

Caretaker governments are transitional arrangements designed to constrain central policymaking discretion during election periods, yet their impact on street-level bureaucratic discretion remains understudied, as well as the potential for democratic backsliding due to such discretion. This chapter questions whether caretaker periods in Pakistan elevate street-level discretion amongst Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS) officers, as predicted by Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracy theory, and examines how these dynamics manifest across political contexts. Employing epistemological diversity, the analysis combines an interpretivist lens with an empiricist examination of Pakistan’s budget data. Public spending patterns reveal systematic election-year spikes in discretionary reallocations and accelerated Sustainable Development Goals Achievement Programme (SAP) disbursements. Findings confirm that while caretaker conventions limit ministerial discretion, they expand street-level autonomy in project timing, beneficiary targeting, and electoral administration. This non-Western extension of street-level bureaucracy theory highlights how transitional governments redistribute rather than eliminate bureaucratic discretion, and how it may lead to potential democratic backsliding in this context.