Can norm‐based information campaigns reduce corruption?

Abstract

Can norm‐based information campaigns reduce corruption? Such campaigns use messaging about how people typically behave (descriptive norms) or ought to behave (injunctive norms). Drawing on survey and lab experiments in Ukraine, we unpack and evaluate the distinct effects of these two types of social norms. Four findings emerge: First, injunctive‐norm messaging produces consistent but relatively small and temporary effects. These may serve as moderately effective, low‐cost anti‐corruption tools but are unlikely to inspire large‐scale norm transformations. Second, contrary to recent studies, we find no evidence that either type of norm‐based messaging “backfires” by inadvertently encouraging corruption. Third, descriptive‐norm messages emphasizing corruption's decline produce relatively large and long‐lasting effects—but only among subjects who find messages credible. Fourth, both types of norm‐based messaging have a substantially larger effect on younger citizens. These findings have broader implications for messaging campaigns, especially those targeting social problems that, like corruption, require mitigation of collective action dilemmas.