Bulwarks or Enablers? Political Elites’ Attitudes to Political Candidates with Armed Group Linkages

Many elections feature candidates with ties to violent groups, yet little is known about the nomination stage. To understand whether political elites serve as gatekeepers against such candidates or whether other desirable traits lead selectors to overlook violent linkages, we study selectors’ preferences in candidate selection. Using an experiment with 11,392 Colombian local political elites, we examine how alleged armed group collusion is weighed against experience, track-records, popular support, and endorsements. We find that candidates with rumored armed group ties face a significant penalty in selectors’ evaluations. Some attributes, particularly experience, reduce this penalty, but none fully offset it. Candidates with ties to armed groups are also less rewarded for strong performance, suggesting that violent linkages diminish returns to otherwise desirable qualities. These findings indicate that the prevalence of violence-linked candidates is not primarily driven by selectors’ willingness to accommodate them, redirecting attention toward concealed linkages and constrained candidate pools.