Blockchain-Enabled Disclosure and Contract Coordination in Fresh-Product Supply Chains: A Stackelberg Game Approach

Digital and intelligent fresh-product supply chains increasingly rely on third-party logistics providers (TPLs) to record and disclose transport-process information. However, the TPL bears data-collection and digital-governance costs while capturing only part of the market value created by credible disclosure. This study develops a supplier-led Stackelberg game for a supplier–TPL–retailer supply chain. Contractual terms are negotiated before operation. Conditional on the negotiated contract, the supplier sets the wholesale price, the TPL selects the disclosure level, and the retailer determines the retail price. We derive decentralized equilibria under blockchain and non-blockchain regimes and compare cost-sharing and joint cost-sharing/revenue-sharing contracts. The results show that cost-sharing increases the TPL’s optimal disclosure level, but disclosure upgrades occur through discrete threshold jumps. Blockchain adoption depends jointly on fixed implementation costs and reliability improvements, and cost-sharing alone may not ensure both adoption and high-level disclosure. Introducing revenue-sharing allows the TPL to internalize part of the demand-side value generated by credible disclosure, leading to a Pareto-improving coordination interval for all supply-chain members. The findings provide a mathematical basis for designing incentive-compatible contracts for blockchain-enabled disclosure in digital fresh product supply chains.