Between dependence and diversification: Armenia’s post-war foreign policy recalibration through the lens of Two-Level Games

Between 2020 and 2025, Armenia neither pivoted west nor remained static. This article explains this outcome as constrained recalibration: rational diversification filtered through domestic ratification pressures under acute insecurity. Using a nested framework that combines a rational-actor baseline with Putnam’s Two-Level Games, it shows how sequencing, external monitoring, and institutional embedding rendered contentious moves to territorial recognition, Western security engagement, and peace legalization, and both domestically ratifiable and internationally credible. Methodologically, the study employs process tracing of 22 key documents and four semi-structured expert interviews. Empirically, it provides the first systematic, episode-by-episode reconstruction of Armenia’s recalibration through the initialing of the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace text (August 2025) and the Armenia–EU Partnership Strategic Agenda (December 2025). Conceptually, it demonstrates that Putnam’s claim inverts for small states under acute insecurity: narrow win-sets generate exploitability rather than bargaining leverage, refining Two-Level Games under asymmetric interdependence.