Behavioral Coordination in Community Pluvial Flood Resilience: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Urban pluvial flood resilience relies not only on engineering defenses but also on effective behavioral coordination among local governments, property management companies (PMCs), and residents. Yet even when risks are recognized, preparedness often fails because costs are immediate and certain, whereas benefits are delayed and probabilistic. This study addresses this dilemma by integrating prospect theory into a tripartite evolutionary game model. We position PMCs as pivotal intermediaries whose maintenance decisions critically influence whether physical infrastructure can be translated into operational resilience. Simulation results show that actors initially remain inactive under uncertainty. Stable collaboration emerges only when government regulation, PMC maintenance, and resident participation reinforce one another. Equal-magnitude policy comparisons reveal an asymmetric policy effect: sufficiently strong penalties induce tripartite cooperation, whereas equivalent subsidies primarily improve PMC maintenance without sustaining resident engagement. Excessive post-disaster relief further weakens ex ante incentives by creating moral hazard. These findings advance community flood governance toward psychologically informed, actor-specific policy mixes, emphasizing clear responsibility allocation, targeted incentives, and conditional relief, to strengthen community-level climate adaptation and adaptive resilience under uncertainty.