Approximating Contribution in Misinformation Mitigation
Jinghao Wang, Renzhe Miao, Yanping Wu, Xiaoyang Wang, Ying Zhang
Online social networks (OSNs) have rapidly emerged as prominent platforms for sharing diverse content, where the word-of-mouth effect drives extensive information propagation. However, such powerful dissemination capabilities also accelerate the spread of misinformation, resulting in significant negative impacts. To combat this, the OSN provider often incentivizes some influencers to initiate the truth campaign, enabling users to receive truth before misinformation and thus suppressing its further spread. This mitigation strategy has proven effective in practice and has consequently attracted substantial research interest, particularly in optimizing influencer selection. In this paper, complementing the existing performance-centric line of work, we address the fair allocation of incentives for engaged influencers, an underexplored dimension that is critical for ensuring the long-term sustainability of misinformation mitigation. We first define a novel contribution metric and reveal its rationality by connecting it to the Shapley value, a classic fairness concept in cooperative game theory. We then formulate the