Agency Coordination on Complex Climate Policy Problems Within Cities

The need for aligned policy responses to coordinate among governmental agencies is challenged by the “administrative silos” prevalent in government bureaucracy. How do collaboration risks influence the abilities of cities to effectively coordinate their efforts to address complex issues such as economic development, climate mitigation, and climate related disaster adaptation? Although coordination problems in the face of administrative silos are widely acknowledged, systematic examination of what accounts for variation in the extent to which local governments are able to successfully coordinate their functions to address complex problems are conspicuously absent from the literature. This research applies functional institutional collective action (ICA) theory to fill this lacuna. Problem uncertainty, actor’s political incentives, and institutions were hypothesized to influence successful coordination. Pooled GLM Probits were estimated with data from 1124 U.S. cities. Uncertainty inherent in specific types of problems, the characteristics of affected actors, and local and regional institutions influenced whether successful coordination among municipal departments was achieved. We conclude by identifying implications for collective action theory and for organizing and standard setting for sustainability policy.