After‐Sales Services Coordination Contracts in Platforms With Integration Mode Operations

ABSTRACT

In service operations, there is an emerging integration mode between platforms, such as Gaode‐Maps DiDi‐Chuxing. In this mode of operation, consumers order on an integrated platform (such as Gaode‐Maps), but accept services from a professional platform (such as DiDi‐Chuxing) or an offline integrator (such as a taxi company). This multiagent characteristic complicates the after‐sales services of the respective integration modes. This study first established three game models in different scenarios and found that depending on the reputation effect and after‐sales service cost, it could be optimal for an integrated platform to avoid providing online after‐sales services. However, the failure to obtain online after‐sales services directly on an integrated platform led to consumer dissatisfaction. Therefore, the deployment of coordination contracts to resolve this problem was meaningful. Second, to realize the Pareto optimality of these platforms, the performance of after‐sales services cost‐sharing (ASCS) contracts was analyzed. We found that, although the ASCS contract incentivized the integrated platform to provide after‐sales services, it stimulated the professional platform and offline integrator to increase prices, leading to a reduction in consumer surplus. Finally, to reduce the order error probability and improve the satisfaction of consumers, we designed an innovative “after‐sales services cost‐sharing plus consumer subsidy” (A‐CS) contract. We proved that the A‐CS contract achieved an all‐win situation for both platform members and consumers.