After Zombies Attack: How Low-Quality Monitors Affect Credible International Election Observers

Abstract

The international election monitoring regime has become considerably more complex in the twenty-first century. Although the number of organizations engaged in high-quality election monitoring has plateaued over time, the number of low-quality monitors that validate autocratic elections has continued to grow. This study investigates how low-quality international election observers affect the behavior of high-quality observers when they are present at the same elections. On the one hand, the presence of low-quality international observers may encourage high-quality groups to step up their game, becoming more thorough and (when merited) more critical in a bid to differentiate themselves from low-quality groups. On the other hand, the presence of low-quality observers may discourage high-quality groups from criticizing flawed elections by introducing counter-narratives, accusing high-quality monitors of bias, and challenging the dominance of high-quality monitors. We test these hypotheses using new data on international election observation from 2000 to 2020, finding evidence that high-quality monitors have become more thorough but less critical in the presence of low-quality monitors.