A Question of Priorities: Nuclear Baseload Versus Pumped Hydro Storage—A Critical Infrastructure Policy Analysis of Australia's Snowy 2.0
Alberto BorettiABSTRACT
Critical infrastructure investment decisions must balance reliability, cost, and decarbonization. Australia has committed AUD 42 billion to Snowy 2.0, a pumped hydro storage project that delivers 2.2 GW of power with 350 GWh of storage at 70% round‐trip efficiency. For a similar or lower cost, China is building 12.5 GW of nuclear baseload capacity, which provides approximately 11.9 GW of continuous, reliable power. It is acknowledged that pumped hydro storage and nuclear baseload serve fundamentally different functions within an electricity system: storage provides flexibility and grid balancing, while nuclear provides firm, dispatchable generation. However, the comparison is justified by the comparable scale of capital investment and the shared policy objective of decarbonization, as well as the opportunity cost of committing such a large sum to a single project. Snowy 2.0 is a net consumer of electricity over a full charge–discharge cycle and can supply only about 0.9 GW of average baseload—just 7.5% of the output of an equivalent nuclear investment. This inherent inefficiency is not a unique weakness of pumped hydro—all storage systems with less than 100% round‐trip efficiency are net consumers of electricity over a complete cycle. The central policy question is whether Snowy 2.0 represents the most cost‐effective way to achieve grid stability and decarbonization compared to alternative investments. The project cannot fully buffer existing wind and solar fleets, which continue to rely on fossil‐fuel peaker plants for grid stability. Despite Australia's vast uranium resources and its role as a major uranium exporter, the country has committed to an expensive, high‐cost storage project whose policy justification may be questionable on techno‐economic grounds. While acknowledging the significant political, regulatory, and social barriers to nuclear deployment in Australia, this paper argues that the choice between nuclear baseload and pumped hydro storage warrants careful examination on critical infrastructure grounds: China builds real baseload nuclear for a fraction of the cost, while Australia subsidizes a project that has been subject to significant cost overruns and whose ability to secure reliable, zero‐carbon electricity is questionable. The analysis demonstrates that even when accounting for the distinct system roles of storage and generation, the scale of the Snowy 2.0 investment—approximately AUD 42 billion—merits comparison with alternative approaches to decarbonization, including nuclear baseload. Policy implications for national infrastructure planning are discussed as tentative considerations rather than definitive conclusions.