A Framework for Monitoring Contaminants in Decentralized Agricultural Systems: Leveraging Stakeholder Incentives in Low-Resource Settings

Decentralized agricultural systems (DAS) are essential to food security for millions of people in low-resource settings, yet most existing contaminant monitoring frameworks have been designed for centralized supply chains. This paper proposes a structured framework for integrating contaminant monitoring into DAS by (1) mapping the diverse supply chain structures and stakeholders that constitute these systems; (2) analyzing stakeholder motivations, constraints, and value propositions for monitoring adoption; and (3) identifying efficient monitoring points where these value propositions align with product quality improvement. The framework is organized around four core principles: tiered monitoring matched to supply chain position and stakeholder capacity, monitoring at stakeholder handoff points rather than within individual segments, incentive structures that make monitoring self-sustaining, and capacity building and governance as durable infrastructure. The framework is illustrated through the case of maize and aflatoxin contamination in Guatemala. It remains a conceptual framework, however, and its principles are intended to be generalizable across crops, contaminants, and geographies rather than demonstrated to be so. Empirical validation across these dimensions remains a necessary next step. The central argument is that through this framework, small, strategically placed incentives at high-leverage points in decentralized supply chains can shift system-wide quality outcomes. This can occur without requiring top-down regulatory enforcement, which is often neither feasible nor effective in these contexts.