A Conceptual Reference Architecture for Robust, Leakage-Resilient and Verifiable Access Control in Secure IoT Outsourcing

Outsourcing Internet-of-Things (IoT) data and computation to cloud and fog infrastructure exposes both the data and the access-control process to integrity, confidentiality, and privacy risks. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) provides fine-grained access control but, as deployed today, suffers from single-authority bottlenecks, expensive policy updates, weak auditability, and exposure to secret-key leakage, classical primitives are additionally threatened by future quantum adversaries. This paper does not propose a new cryptographic scheme. Instead, it contributes a conceptual reference architecture that systematizes how a set of existing, standardized primitives can be composed into a single access-control framework for IoT outsourcing, and it makes the resulting design precise enough to reason about. Concretely, we (i) define a system model and a threat model covering passive, active, colluding, bounded-leakage, and harvest-now-decrypt-later quantum adversaries; (ii) instantiate each layer with a named construction decentralized multi-authority ABE, attribute-based proxy re-encryption for policy updates, a bounded leakage resilient key model, ASCON lightweight AEAD, and ML-KEM/ML-DSA post-quantum primitives, together with a permissioned, on-chain digest/off-chain payload logging layer; (iii) specify the end-to-end data flow and module interfaces; and (iv) give a goal-by-goal security rationale and an analytical evaluation based only on standardized parameter sizes and asymptotic complexity. We are explicit about what is inherited from prior work, what remains to be proven for the composed system, and that a measured prototype evaluation remains future work. The intended value of this paper is to provide a clear, composable, and honestly scoped design that subsequent implementation studies can build upon.