A Communication-Aware Game-Theoretic Coordination Framework for Distributed Pump Stations in Pipeline Systems

In large-scale fluid transport systems, distributed pump and valve stations must coordinate their operations to prevent overpressure while minimizing energy use and control effort. This paper presents a communication-aware, game-theoretic coordination framework in which stations act as rational agents that iteratively adjust operating setpoints based on locally computed utilities. Existing station-level pressure controllers regulate local pressures and flows, while a slower supervisory negotiation layer governs inter-station coordination using steady-state hydraulic surrogates derived from pump affinity laws and pipeline loss relationships. The proposed framework does not rely on centralized optimization or exhaustive enumeration of strategies. Instead, stations update setpoints sequentially, evaluating incremental changes in utility to determine beneficial adjustments and detect equilibrium conditions. Cooperative behavior emerges naturally when communication is available, enabling stations to internalize the hydraulic impact of their actions on neighboring stations. When communication is lost, the system transitions seamlessly to a non-cooperative mode in which each station optimizes its local objective while maintaining safe operation. Simulation studies conducted on a multi-station pipeline with mixed actuator types demonstrate measurable performance improvements over fixed-setpoint operation. Cooperative coordination reduces total system energy usage from 39.6 MW to 38.8 MW while increasing average control valve openness from 60.4% to 63.7%. Non-cooperative operation converges more rapidly but results in higher energy consumption (39.2 MW) and greater valve throttling. Under partial communication loss, the system preserves near-cooperative energy performance (38.8 MW) with a modest increase in convergence time, demonstrating robustness to degraded communication. Across all simulated scenarios, the iterative game converged to stationary operating points consistent with Nash-equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative settings and Pareto-stationary solutions in cooperative communication settings.