Manufacturer Channel-Selection Strategy Considering Information Sharing Under Uncertain Demand

Taking into account retailers’ resistance and operational costs, manufacturer enterprises are facing the optimal decision-making problem of whether and what kind of direct sales channels to open. Meanwhile, against the backdrop of asymmetric demand information, how does retailers’ information sharing affect manufacturers’ channel selection? Based on this, this study considers three types of sales channels for manufacturers in the context of asymmetric demand information: a traditional channel, online direct sales channel, and subsidiary direct sales channel. Six supply chain game models are established under the retailer’s information strategy, and the manufacturer’s channel-selection decision and the retailer’s information-sharing decision are analyzed. The study demonstrates that when information is shared, the online direct sales channel represents the optimal choice. Conversely, when information sharing is absent, the manufacturer will select the subsidiary direct channel when the subsidiary sales channel opening cost is minimal, and the unit direct selling cost of online direct sales channels is moderate. Furthermore, we discover that retailers lack motivation to share demand information. Therefore, we propose an information-sharing incentive system to encourage retailers to voluntarily share information with manufacturers, aiming for Pareto optimization in the supply chain.